Lawrence Lessig’s recent article Against Transparency and several subsequent responses [1] have stimulated my thinking quite a bit recently. I don’t feel qualified to say anything too significant or original about transparency because I’m new to the debates within the field. However, I have one immediate question.
First, let me briefly recap what attracts me to both Lessig’s argument and some of the responses to it.
Lessig worries about “naked transparency,” a term that is less than clear to me, but seems to represent those groups who advocate for releasing as much data to the public domain as possible, but who don’t have a plan for how the data can be most meaningfully used.
We know that most of us will not take the time to study the data and what they are capable of revealing to us. We will instead be myopic. We will allow the data to prove our conclusions and will not consider the ways in which we may be wrong. According to Lessig, the “naked transparency” movement ignores this reality. The data released in its name will be an trough for hyperbolic, irrational argument.
As several respondents noted, “naked transparency” as used in the article is basically a straw man. But perhaps more importantly, it’s not as if the level of hyperbolic, irrational argument is currently on the decline. Poor reasoning was here last year and it will be here next year. So, why should the constant misuse of data be relevant to whether more data are released? One instead hopes more data will increase, if only slightly, those times when someone presents a really strong argument to us.
Now, my question: Is there any empirical way to talk about the relationship between transparency and argument? As I understand the debate, one could assume there was a time before more transparency (BMT) and after more transparency (AMT). It would be nice if, in judging whether Lessig or his critics are correct, we could take the arguments BMT and compare them with the volume, or salience, or effect, or whatever, of arguments AMT. But how? And if we don’t have these empirical data available, does the transparency question thereby become philosophical — part of the debate about, say, the responsibilities of government?
As I said, this field is new for me. I would really appreciate your sharing of any good resources, books, or articles to help me understand the debate.
PS: Lessig responds to some of his critics in part by saying his argument is different from what I understood it to be: That some data are literally meaningless, or so complex as to be extremely difficult to understand, and these are the data that will be misused and that the “naked transparency” movement needs a plan to handle. For my part, I don’t really see the original article making this point, but I will assume he at least meant it. Regardless, is this question not also an empirical one? Which data are these uber-complex ones? How do we draw that distinction?
1. The articles I read in response to Lessig:
- Jonathan Eyler-Werve, Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency. We’re Not
- Ellen Miller and Michael Klein, More scrutiny of government is the solution, not the problem
- David Weinberger, Greater transparency will build – not diminish – the public’s trust, and Larry Lessig: Beyond Transparency, and Net Triumphalism
- Ethan Zuckerman, On connecting the dots – a response to Lessig on transparency
- Chris Berendes, Lessig: control transparency? No way!
- Carl Malamud, Larry Lessig and Naked Transparency
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